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Abstract: Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is 
thought that only the blameworthy can be appropriately forgiven but that the blameworthy are 
appropriately blamed not forgiven.  Some have appealed to the notion of repentance to resolve 
this tension. But others have objected that such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the 
sense that it merely stipulates and names a solution leaving the transformative power of 
repentance unexplained. Worse still, others have objected that such a response cannot succeed 
because no amount of repentance can render the blameworthy not blameworthy. I argue that this 
latter objection is based on a mistaken assumption, the acknowledgement of which has the power 
to resolve the paradox in a way that meets the explanatory adequacy challenge, and, more 
generally, has significant implications with which any full theory of forgiveness must engage.  
 





Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is thought that its 
appropriate application involves a deep tension. On the one hand, forgiveness could be 
appropriately directed at a person only if that person is blameworthy. But, on the other hand, if 
such a person is blameworthy then it would seem that blame and not forgiveness is the proper 
response. Forgiveness, then, has been thought to involve “a kind of double vision” (Calhoun 
1992: 82); it involves seeing the person as one towards whom blame both is and is not apt. Some 
have claimed that appeal to the notion of repentance can resolve this tension; repentance makes 
forgiveness appropriate (Murphy in Murphy and Hampton 1988). But others have objected that 
such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the sense that it merely stipulates and names a 
solution leaving the transformative power of repentance unexplained (Zaibert 2009). Worse still, 
others have objected that such a response cannot succeed because no amount of repentance can 
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render the blameworthy not blameworthy (Hallich 2013; 2016; Kekes 2009; Wallace 2019; 
Warmke and McKenna 2013). I argue that this latter objection is based on a mistaken 
assumption, the acknowledgement of which has the power to resolve the paradox in a way that 
meets the explanatory adequacy challenge, and, more generally, has significant implications with 
which any full theory of forgiveness must engage. This will require, however, wading into the 
largely uncharted waters of the norms governing diachronic blame. 
 Let me begin by briefly identifying some assumptions I make about forgiveness and 
some related concepts. First, I assume that forgiveness is closely linked to blame, more 
specifically, its absence. Whatever else (full) forgiveness is, it necessarily involves the cessation 
of blame (see Allais 2008: 33; Milam 2018a; while I here assume that full forgiveness requires 
the cessation of blame, I also believe, as we will see, that partial forgiveness requires the 
reduction of blame). That is, I take it that blame and forgiveness are closely linked and yet 
importantly disanalogous. Blame and forgiveness are categorically distinct in the literal sense 
that they fall into distinct categories, for forgiveness involves an adjustment with respect to that 
with which blame is identified. For example, if blame is identified as an attitude, then 
forgiveness will consist in a particular kind of attitudinal adjustment (similarly, Kekes 2009: 492 
characterizes forgiveness as an event; contrast this with those, such as Gamlund 2010, who 
characterize forgiveness as itself a reactive attitude.).  
 Second, I shall assume that blame is properly identified with an intentional attitude, or 
range of such attitudes, the paradigm instance of which is resentment. This is an assumption 
made by many working on moral responsibility within the Strawsonian tradition (see Strawson 
1962). When combined with the previous assumption, this yields the view that forgiveness 
typically involves the cessation of resentment. This view itself finds a home in work on 
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forgiveness in the Butlerian tradition which identifies forgiveness as the overcoming or 
foreswearing of resentment (see Butler 1726: Sermons 8 and 9, and, for one influential example, 
Murphy and Hampton 1988: 20). I emphasize that I assume only that resentment is a form of 
blame, leaving room for the possibility that other intentional attitudes are as well (such as 
disappointment, sadness or dispassionate disapproval; see Richards 1988; Kekes 2009; Portmore 
forthcoming). I do assume, however, that all such blaming attitudes have a characteristic 
intentional content, even if their affective texture differs. Thus, I assume that forgiveness 
involves the cessation of resentment or any other blaming attitudes, though for ease of 
expression I shall speak simply of resentment and its cessation.   
 Third, I’ll appeal to the following general account of intentional attitudes and a particular 
sense of appropriateness that governs them. Intentional attitudes are attitudes that have 
intentional or representational content; they are about something, they represent their objects to 
be a certain way. And the attitude is appropriate, in this sense, to the extent that the 
representation is accurate. This is meant to capture the sense of appropriateness of an attitude 
that is referred to as fittingness and which I will also refer to as worthiness. It is a sense of 
appropriateness that is distinct from epistemic justification, prudence, and overall desirability. It 
concerns whether the attitude correctly represents the world in a way that is analogous to the 
relation between belief and truth. To illustrate, the attitude of fear represents its object to be 
dangerous in some way. The object is worthy of fear to the extent that the constituent 
representation is accurate, that is, to the extent that the object is actually dangerous. The object 
could be worthy of fear even if fear was inappropriate in some other sense. For example, a 
dangerous animal may be fear-worthy even if fear would be undesirable because the animal 
becomes more dangerous when it senses fear (Portmore 2019: 54). And while an attitude is 
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appropriate in this sense in virtue of the accuracy of its constituent representation, an attitudinal 
adjustment may be appropriate, in the intended sense, when it involves making one’s attitudes 
less unfitting. Thus, fourth, the worthiness of blame qua intentional attitude will be a matter of 
the fittingness of resentment, which itself is a matter of the accuracy of the intentional content of 
resentment. And, by extension, an adjustment in one’s resentment will be appropriate, in the 
targeted sense, when it makes one’s resentment less unfitting (see D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; in 
the context of blame see Graham 2014; Rosen 2015; Portmore forthcoming; in the context of 
forgiveness see Murphy and Hampton 1988: 29-30; Murphy 2003: 22-23; Hieronymi 2001; 
Allais 2008; Pettigrove 2021).1 
 To summarize: I will treat (full) forgiveness as requiring the cessation of blame, blame as 
the attitude of resentment, resentment as an attitude with intentional content consisting in a 
representation of its object, and the worthiness of resentment as a matter of the accuracy of its 
constituent representation. The first two assumptions naturally accord with the common 
Butlerian claim that forgiveness involves the overcoming or forswearing of resentment. The 
latter two appeal to a common view of emotions qua intentional mental states. With this 
framework in mind, let us turn to the paradox of forgiveness.  
 
2. The paradox of forgiveness, the appeal to repentance, and an implicit metaphysical 
assumption 
 
1 I characterize fittingness here as a matter of accurate representation, what Howard (2018) [following Rosen 
(2015)] calls the alethic view and Na’aman (2021) calls the object view. As Na’aman characterizes the view, “F is a 
fitting response to X iff X is E where E is the evaluative property that F attributes to X” (254). While it is probably 
safe to say that this is the most common conception of fittingness it is not without its critics (see Howard 2018 for an 
overview). Do note, however, that the primary argument of this paper does not require accepting the claim that the 
fittingness of resentment is exhausted by accuracy of representation, but merely that fitting resentment requires 
accuracy of representation. It is, then, compatible with Na’aman’s view that some fitting attitudes, such as 




The paradox of forgiveness, as I see it, most basically consists in the claim that appropriate 
forgiveness is logically impossible; forgiveness is never a fitting response. On the one hand, the 
appropriate target of forgiveness must be a blameworthy agent. One cannot, for example, 
appropriately forgive in virtue of acknowledging that the agent was not, after all, blameworthy. 
The cessation of blame, in such cases, would be due to the fact that one has come to accept that 
the agent had either an excuse or a justification. And this, clearly, does not amount to appropriate 
forgiveness because it does not amount to forgiveness at all. Appropriate forgiveness requires 
that the target be a blameworthy agent. But, on the other hand, if the target of appropriate 
forgiveness must be a blameworthy agent then it seems to follow that the agent is worthy of 
blame, not its cessation. The paradox can be stated thusly:  
 
(1) One can appropriately forgive only blameworthy agents.  
(2) A blameworthy agent is appropriately blamed, not forgiven.  
(3) Thus, one can appropriately forgive only those who are not appropriately forgiven.  
 
 (3) follows from (1) and (2), and yet both (1) and (2) appear to be quite plausible. It’s been 
thought that if one were to reject (1), then forgiveness would have no point for forgiveness only 
makes sense in response to blameworthiness. The cessation of blame in the absence of 
blameworthiness, it seems, would have to be due to the fact that one has come to accept that the 
agent’s act was either excused or justified. And if the act was excused or justified, then there 
would be nothing to forgive. On the other hand, it’s been argued that a rejection of (2) would 
involve a failure to properly acknowledge that blameworthiness essentially involves the 
fittingness of condemnation. And a failure to properly condemn a transgression that merits such 
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a response risks condoning it or not taking it sufficiently seriously in some way. Thus, the 
paradox of forgiveness claims that one can appropriately forgive only those who are not 
appropriately forgiven; forgiveness is never a fitting response (see Kolnai 1973-4: 99 who 
originally formulated the paradox as the claim that “forgiveness is either unjustified or 
pointless,” unjustified if directed at a blameworthy agent, pointless if not; see also Murphy and 
Hampton 1988: 42; Hieronymi 2001; Allais 2008; Kekes 2009; Zaibert 2009; and Hallich 2013). 
 Faced with this tension, a number of theorists have emphasized the importance of 
repentance, defending the claim that forgiveness is appropriate when directed at the repentant. In 
direct response to the paradox, as formulated above, one may develop this response in one of two 
ways. One may, for example, argue that (1) is false because repentance can erase 
blameworthiness. Or alternatively, one may reject (2) claiming that the repentantly blameworthy 
are not appropriately blamed. But however the response is developed, why should we accept that 
repentance has this powerful transformative property? The most common answer appeals to the 
distancing between act and agent in which repentance consists. Jeffrie Murphy, for example, tells 
us: 
[Repentance] is surely the clearest way in which a wrongdoer can sever himself from his 
past wrong. In having a sincere change of heart, he is withdrawing his endorsement from 
his own immoral past behavior; he is saying, “I no longer stand behind the wrongdoing, 
and I want to be separated from it. I stand with you in condemning it.” Of such a person it 
cannot be said that he is now conveying the message that he holds me in contempt. Thus I 
can relate to him now, through forgiveness, without fearing my own acquiescence in 
immorality or in judgments that I lack worth. I forgive him for what he now is. (Murphy 
and Hampton 1988: 26) 
 
On Murphy’s view, wrong action sends an offensive or demeaning message to its victim. 
Repentance involves the withdrawal of this message, and it is this that makes forgiveness 
appropriate (for a related view see Hieronymi 2001). While there is surely something appealing 
about the idea that repentance can make forgiveness appropriate in this way, it has struck some 
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as frustratingly vague. For example, Leo Zaibert (2009) finds the account explanatorily 
unsatisfying, variously referring to this transformative property of repentance as “alchemistic” 
(377) and “quasi-magical” (379). He explains: 
Yet, the question as to what exactly this awesome power of repentance is remains 
unanswered. Unfortunately, the defenders of the forgiveness-requires-repentance thesis 
say precious little of help in answering this question. Merely to assert that repentance is 
communicative along the lines that these defenders sketch is not to explain why this 
communication has the effects that they claim it has. (380) 
 
Thus Zaibert holds that extant appeals to repentance are explanatorily wanting. As I read him, 
the objection is that the appeal to repentance merely names, by stipulation, a solution to the 
paradox. It does not, however, provide a developed and independently motivated one. 
 Brandon Warmke and Michael McKenna agree that the appeal to repentance requires a 
deeper explanation than what is so far on offer, and they claim further that there is a prima facie 
case against any such explanation: 
One might think that forgiveness is appropriate when the wrongdoer has had a change of 
heart, apologized, requested forgiveness, and the like. Perhaps something like this is 
correct but, if so, some sort of explanation is called for. Engaging in these activities does 
not achieve exculpation—one can still be blameworthy even when one has had a change 
of heart, apologized, and asked for forgiveness. Breivik would remain morally 
blameworthy for his killings even had he immediately apologized and had a change of 
heart. So the puzzle remains: a wrongdoer remains blameworthy even after a change of 
heart, apology, etc. (2013: 207) 
 
Warmke and McKenna claim that the appeal to repentance cannot straightforwardly ease the 
tension of forgiveness because repentance cannot render a blameworthy agent not blameworthy 
[thus, they interpret the appeal to repentance as involving the first strategy of denying (1)]. 
Wrongdoers, they tell us, remain blameworthy even after repentance. Why accept this claim? I 
believe that many, frequently implicitly, take it to follow from more general metaphysical 
considerations relating to the fixity of the past and the numerical identity of persons. 
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Occasionally, these background assumptions come to the forefront. For example, consider John 
Kekes: 
But Straight blamed Bent for causing him undeserved, unjustified, and non-trivial harm, 
and nothing Bent could conceivably do after having done that could change what he did. 
Future events cannot change past events. If Straight's blame was reasonable before Bent's 
repentance, then it remains reasonable after it as well…No amount of repentance by Bent 
could alter the fact that he got Straight fired in order to get the promotion. That is what 
makes it reasonable for Straight to blame Bent. (2009: 502)  
 
In a similar vein, R. Jay Wallace writes: 
This familiar syndrome of ex post reactions to wrongful behavior [e.g. remorse, apology, 
making amends, resolving to do better] on the part of the agent of the behavior does not 
undo the wrong that they originally visited on the other party, and so it remains fitting for 
that party to resent the agent on that account. (2019: 546) 
 
And finally and most explicitly, Oliver Hallich: 
Occasionally, we even talk of a remorseful wrongdoer’s “moral rebirth” and seem to 
assume that sincere repentance causes a rupture in personal identity over time...First, our 
talk of “moral rebirth” cannot be taken literally. The remorseful rapist does not, because 
he is remorseful, cease to be the person who committed the rape. He is still numerically 
identical with the wrongdoer…The past cannot be undone, and if what you have done in 
the past is something that deserves moral blame and resentment, it does so irrespective of 
the fact that you may later come to feel remorse and repentance…Brutal as it is, the truth 
is that good deeds cannot eliminate moral guilt since the wrongdoer, even after redressing 
the harm, is still numerically identical with the person who brought a moral wrong into 
the world. (2016: 1014-1016) 
 
What these authors are claiming, I think, is that repentance does not have the power to falsify 
what they take to be an obvious metaphysical fact: that the blameworthy remain blameworthy. 
And though only Hallich is explicit about this, the claim that the blameworthy remain 
blameworthy implicates the notion of personal identity. For what is meant by this claim is that  
the blameworthy remain blameworthy for the remainder of their existence (e.g. even after 
repentance), and the duration of a person’s existence is a matter of the correct criterion of 
personal identity. Though it may not be immediately obvious, this is how the claim that the 
blameworthy remain blameworthy involves the notion of personal identity. For it is to claim that 
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if one is now personally identical with a past blameworthy agent, then one is now blameworthy. 
No amount of repentance could provide the relevant distancing between act and agent, short of a 
radical break in personal identity.  
 The metaphysical assumption implicit in the above objection can be made more explicit. 
But before that can be done, a distinction must first be introduced. The distinction is between 
synchronic blameworthiness and diachronic blameworthiness (and moral responsibility, more 
generally; see Khoury 2013; Matheson 2014; and Khoury and Matheson 2018). Synchronic 
blameworthiness concerns the blameworthiness of an agent at the time of the action, while 
diachronic blameworthiness concerns the blameworthiness of an agent at some later time.  
Exactly how the distinction is formulated will depend upon the underlying conception of 
time to which one appeals. Here, I’ll formulate these temporal claims on four-dimensionalism 
(see, for example, Sider 2001). On this approach to persistence and change, the subject of an 
attribution of blameworthiness (or any other property that is had at or through time) is a temporal 
part of a whole, a time-slice. Thus, synchronic blameworthiness concerns an agent at t1’s 
blameworthiness for an act that occurs at t1. And diachronic blameworthiness concerns an agent 
at t2’s blameworthiness for an act at t1. But note that nothing in my argument requires the 
adoption of four-dimensionalism. One could instead adopt a three-dimensional relational view 
according to which the property of blameworthiness itself is a temporal relation (e.g. S is 
blameworthy at t for X), or opt for a number of other approaches depending on how one wishes 
to deal with the problem of temporary intrinsics (see Lewis 1986: 203-205; Sider 2001: 92-98).  
One simplifying feature of four-dimensionalism is that that the relevant propositions are 
taken to be timelessly true, and so avoids additional complexities arising from “taking tense 
seriously” which involves the notion that propositions are true at times. Thus, if ‘[S at t1] is 
10 
 
blameworthy for X’, then this is a timeless truth and can be truly asserted at any later time. 
However, if S does not exist at t3, then while ‘[S at t1] is blameworthy for X’ remains timelessly 
true and so can be truly asserted at t3, ‘[S at t3] is blameworthy for X’ is not true because [S at t3] 
fails to refer to an object that exists (these claims are easily conflated if one is not careful about 
these issues of formulation and background ontological assumptions). This follows 
uncontroversially from the general ontology. However, if ‘[S at t1] is blameworthy for X,’ then, 
if [S at t2] exists, whether ‘[S at t2] is blameworthy for X’ is a substantive question concerning 
the nature of blameworthiness over time.  
It is an assumption concerning this question that underlies the above rejection of the 
appeal to repentance. The assumption is that if one was blameworthy for an action at one point in 
one’s life, then one will still be blameworthy for that action at all later points in one’s life. This is 
to claim, if only implicitly, that personal identity is the diachronic ownership condition on 
blameworthiness and moral responsibility more generally. It is to claim that being personally 
identical with a past blameworthy agent itself suffices for diachronic blameworthiness. More 
precisely, if [A at t1] is blameworthy to degree d for committing act X at t1, then [B at t2] is 
blameworthy to degree d for X at t1 if [A at t1] and [B at t2] are stages of the same person.2  
 According to this sufficiency claim, blameworthiness does not vary over time so long as 
personal identity holds. A commitment to this view is, I think, plausibly read off the above 
quotes from Warmke and McKenna (2013: 207), Kekes (2009: 502), Wallace (2019: 546), and 
Hallich (2016:1016; also see Kolnai 1973-4: 101; Hallich 2013; and Richards 1988: 87, among 
others). What these authors claim, if only implicitly, is that appeal to repentance cannot solve the 
paradox of forgiveness because repentance cannot diminish or extinguish blameworthiness 
 
2 The stages-of-the-same-person relation is appealed to here rather than personal identity because the relata in the 




because the repentant remain personally identical with the author of the blameworthy act. And 
even in an unrealistic thought-experiment involving the severing of personal identity, it has been 
claimed that there is a residual paradox of forgiveness:  
 But even in a case like this a rupture in personal identity over time would not generate a 
 duty to forgive. The reason why it would not is that if the repentant person were no 
 longer identical with the wrongdoer, this would simply mean that the wrongdoer had 
 ceased to exist. It would then be impossible to forgive him because the repentant person 
 in front of us would be dissociated from the wrongdoer and there would no longer be an 
 addressee for forgiveness. So there would be nobody to forgive and the question whether 
 we ought to forgive could not arise. (Hallich 2013: 1007) 
 
In sum, these authors believe that the appeal to repentance cannot solve the paradox of 
forgiveness because they believe, if only implicitly, that personal identity is the diachronic 
ownership condition on blameworthiness. But despite these implicit and explicit appeals to 
personal identity, Charles Griswold is hardly unique amongst forgiveness theorists in remarking 
that he “will not venture into the extremely difficult problems of personal identity” (2007: 50). 
Unfortunately, this is not something that we can avoid if we wish to properly understand the 
relation between forgiveness, repentance, and diachronic blameworthiness.  
 
3. Personal identity and the nature of diachronic blameworthiness 
I’ve argued at length elsewhere that personal identity is not the diachronic ownership condition 
on blameworthiness (see Khoury and Matheson 2018; also see Shoemaker 2012; Khoury 2013; 
and Matheson 2014). Insofar as my interest here is in exploring the implications of this view for 
forgiveness, I’ll try to summarize the argument as briefly as I can.  
 However, the plausibility of the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic 
blameworthiness cannot be adequately assessed in the absence of engagement with some of the 
details of the literature on personal identity. First, personal identity is a form of numerical 
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identity. Numerical identity is a relation that holds between a thing and itself; it is an equivalence 
relation that is binary and transitive. It is binary in the sense that it is not scalar; it doesn’t come 
in degrees. A and B are either numerically identical or not. And it is transitive in the familiar 
sense that if A is identical with B and B is identical with C, then A is identical with C. Because 
numerical identity has these logical properties, personal identity, qua form of numerical identity, 
will also have these logical properties.3  
 In order to generate a criterion of personal identity that has the proper logic, the two 
leading accounts of personal identity both appeal to the notion of continuity. The biological 
approach, for example, holds that personal identity is a matter of continuity of vital biological 
function (see Olson 1997). The psychological approach holds that personal identity is a matter of 
continuity of psychology (see Parfit 1984: 202-209). What is important for our purposes is that 
continuity of either of these sorts does not entail the persistence of any distinctive psychological 
content, where distinctive psychological content refers to the psychological properties that vary 
person to person (see Parfit 1984: 300-301, 515n6, 517n17). This is obviously true with respect 
to the biological approach insofar as a person’s vital biological functions can persist in the 
absence of any psychology whatsoever (as when in a persistent vegetative state).  
 But it is no less true with respect to the psychological approach. This view begins by 
appealing to the notion of a direct psychological connection. Historically, attention has been 
focused on the connections between memory and experience (Locke 1694). An experience is 
directly psychologically connected to a memory when the experience causes the memory and the 
memory is of that experience. These two states are connected when they are bound by relations 
 
3 On four-dimensionalism the question of the correct criteria of personal identity is not a question of what makes [A 
at t1] numerically identical to [A at t2]. It is what makes [A at t1] and [A at t2] stages of the same person. Note, 
however, that this unity relation will also need to be transitive and non-scalar. In the remainder of this section, I 
ignore this complication.  
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of causality and similarity. The same is true for other psychological states as well, such as beliefs 
and desires. A belief at an earlier time is directly connected to a belief at a later time when the 
former causes the latter and they have the same content. This is simply an account of the 
persistence of individual psychological states. Overall psychological connectedness between two 
points in time is a matter of the total number and strength of these individual direct connections 
between these two times. Connectedness, however, is a scalar relation; it comes in degrees. And 
so the defender of the psychological approach has some work to do to arrive at a criterion of 
identity with the appropriate logic. Appeal to the notion of strong psychological connectedness 
yields a non-scalar notion. Strong psychological connectedness is defined as the threshold of 
overall psychological connectedness that is itself necessary and sufficient for identity to hold day 
to day.4 It thus yields a binary relation, for two person-stages are either strongly psychologically 
connected or not.  
 But although the notion of strong psychological connectedness is non-scalar, it is 
intransitive. You are strongly connected to your self yesterday, your self yesterday is strongly 
connected to your self the day before that and so on. But you are not, I assume, strongly 
connected to your two-year-old self. Yet you are personally identical with your two-year-old 
self. So the defender of the psychological approach has some additional work to do in order to 
yield a criterion that is also transitive. This is where appeal to the notion of continuity enters. 
Continuity, as a general matter, is the ancestral relation of some underlying relation. This means 
that continuity of a particular type holds between A and B when there are overlapping chains of 
some particular underlying relation between A and B. On the biological approach, this 
underlying relation will be some kind of biological connection. On the psychological approach 
 
4 Parfit tells us that “at least half the number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person” 
(1984: 206) is sufficient for strong connectedness, though he is often incorrectly interpreted as claiming that this is 
itself the threshold for strong connectedness. 
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the underlying relation is that of strong psychological connectedness. Though you are not 
strongly psychologically connected to your two-year-old self, there are overlapping chains of 
strong psychological connectedness between you now and your two-year-old self. Thus, you are 
psychologically continuous with your two-year-old self. We now have a psychological relation, 
psychological continuity, that has the appropriate logic. 
 Importantly, ensuring that this psychological relation has the necessary logic to be a 
candidate criterion of the numerical identity of persons entails that this psychological relation 
implies nothing about one’s distinctive psychology. This is not simply a buggy and dispensable 
feature of some particular account, but a consequence of securing the transitivity of identity in 
the face of change over time. Continuity consists in the holding of overlapping chains of some 
underlying relation. It can therefore hold over some duration in the absence of there being any 
direct link of that underlying relation over that duration. This, in turn, entails that psychological 
continuity is compatible with complete and total change in one’s distinctive psychological 
features.  
 It is this implication that reveals the implausibility of the claim that personal identity is 
sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. Both psychological and biological continuity can hold 
between a person at t1 and a person at t2 regardless of the content of their distinctive 
psychologies at those times. Thus, it is possible that a person who is a complete and total time-
slice psychological twin of your preferred moral exemplar at t2 is psychologically and 
biologically continuous with a person who is a complete and total time-slice psychological twin 
of your preferred moral monster at t1. Hence, on the two leading accounts of personal identity, it 
is possible that the moral monster at t1 is personally identical with the moral exemplar at t2. The 
sufficiency claim thereby implies that in that case the moral exemplar is blameworthy for the 
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actions of the moral monster, irrespective of what she is like at t2. This is, at least to my mind, an 
absurd result.  
 The reason it is implausible to think that the moral exemplar at t2 is blameworthy for the 
action of the moral monster at t1 is, presumably, because they do not resemble each other 
psychologically whatsoever. On the assumption that blame is the attitude of resentment, and that 
resentment is an attitude that represents its object to be a certain way, then an object is worthy of 
resentment only if its constituent representation is accurate. I believe the intentional content of 
resentment involves the attribution of some defective psychological states to the subject that 
ground the particular kind of criticizability in which blameworthiness consists. In addition to 
providing what I think is the best explanation of the intuition that the exemplar at t2 is not 
blameworthy for the action of the monster at t1, I believe this claim is also supported by 
phenomenal introspection. To resent another is, at least in part, to represent that other as being 
flawed in this way. The moral exemplar at t2, however, has no morally criticizable psychological 
states by stipulation. There is, then, no sense in which anyone could demand that the moral 
exemplar morally improve herself and so, I think, it makes no sense to think that she is 
blameworthy. 
 If the foregoing is correct, then this provides a counterexample to the claim that personal 
identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. Personal identity holds in this case. The 
moral exemplar at t2 and the moral monster at t1 are stages of the same person, and yet the moral 
exemplar at t2 is not blameworthy for the actions of the moral monster at t1. Therefore, the 
sufficiency claim is false (for more extensive discussion see Khoury and Matheson 2018).  
This leaves us with the question of what it is that grounds diachronic blameworthiness, if 
not personal identity? Reflection on the above case in which a total lack of diachronic 
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blameworthiness seems to be explained by a total lack of any direct psychological connections, 
suggests that diachronic blameworthiness must consist in the presence of some direct 
psychological connections. Which direct psychological connections are the relevant ones? 
Various options are available. We may choose to set the bar relatively low, perhaps claiming that 
a single memory connection to a past synchronically blameworthy action suffices for diachronic 
blameworthiness. Or we may choose to set the bar higher, requiring some more robust set of 
psychological connections.  
On my own view the relevant psychological connections concern the persistence of the 
criticizable psychological states expressed in the action (whatever those happen to be), in virtue 
of which the agent was synchronically blameworthy for the action (for the view that the 
properties that ground [synchronic] blameworthiness must themselves be psychological states of 
the agent see Khoury 2018; for the view that diachronic blameworthiness consists in the 
persistence of such states, see Khoury 2013; Khoury and Matheson 2018). When there is 
maximal relevant psychological connectedness across time, which is to say that the criticizable 
psychological states persist undiminished, then there is no diminishment of blameworthiness 
across that time. When there is no relevant psychological connectedness across time whatsoever, 
then there is total diminishment of blameworthiness across that time. And when there is partial 
diminishment of relevant psychological connectedness across time, then there is partial 
diminishment of blameworthiness across that time. On this view, note, diachronic 
blameworthiness does not follow the logic of numerical identity. It can diminish and extinguish 
across time which is to say that it is scalar and intransitive. This view, on which the property of 
blameworthiness can diminish and extinguish over time, may strike those caught in the grips of 
the sufficiency claim as puzzling. Be that as it may, let me emphasize that this view is no more 
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metaphysically puzzling than the view that the property of being an insightful philosopher or a 
fast swimmer can also diminish and extinguish over time. Furthermore, there is a growing body 
of empirical research showing that folk judgments of deserved punishment and moral criticism  
for past wrongs are directly sensitive to judgments of psychological connectedness (see Tierney 
et al. 2014; Mott 2018).  
It is worth noting that a given positive proposal of the relevant direct psychological 
connections is independent of the argument against the sufficiency claim. Thus, an objection to a 
particular positive account of the relevant sort of psychological connections is not itself an 
objection to the argument against the sufficiency claim. Despite this, let me end this section by 
briefly considering an objection, the response to which will hopefully lend plausibility to the 
general approach. The objection is that the view that diachronic blameworthiness consists in the 
persistence of the criticizable psychological states in virtue of which the agent is synchronically 
blameworthy makes it too easy to get off the hook. For instance, suppose that I commit a 
blameworthy action today. I am a fickle person, however, with fleeting psychological states, so 
tomorrow I wake up and no longer have the same psychological states in virtue of which I was 
previously blameworthy. Am I really claiming that a person could escape blameworthiness so 
easily?  
The plausibility of this objection rests on assuming that the relevant psychological states 
are such that they could be eliminated rather rapidly and in such a way that leaves the person 
relatively and relevantly unchanged. But this won’t be feasible if we acknowledge (i) the holism 
of mental content and (ii) take the relevant psychological states to concern deep features of the 
agent such as her values and concerns. The holism of mental content says that our mental states 
make up a complex and interconnected web such that an alteration in one state will require 
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updating any other states with which it is rationally connected (see Dennett 1978; Levy 2007: 
161-165). And one’s values and concerns as expressed in action, facts about one’s quality of will 
I would say, are agentially deep partly in virtue of the fact that they have many such rational 
connections to other states (see Sripada 2016). Eliminating or dissolving one’s deep values and 
concerns would require eliminating that in which they consist, a complex set of affective, 
volitional, and epistemic dispositions as well as any further states with which these are rationally 
connected. This is not a superficial change and the resulting person would be very significantly 
different (a different moral self we might be inclined to say). Nor is this the sort of change that 
ordinarily occurs overnight.5 More commonly such deep change is a long, slow, and often 
painful process just of the sort associated with genuine repentance.  
 
4. Resolving the paradox and meeting the explanatory challenge 
Let us return now to the paradox of forgiveness. Earlier, I formulated the paradox as follows: 
 
(1) One can only appropriately forgive a blameworthy agent.  
(2) A blameworthy agent is appropriately blamed, not forgiven.  
(3) Thus, one can appropriately forgive only those who are not appropriately forgiven.  
 
We are now in a position to see that the original formulation involves an equivocation. ‘A 
blameworthy agent’ as it is used in (1) minimally refers to an agent who was blameworthy at 
 
5 One exception being death (see Khoury and Matheson [2018: 206-209]). Another exception may involve minor 
wrongs, which, roughly, may only require a polishing up of one’s character rather than a character overhaul. Finally, 
note that while a change in a deep value or concern would typically give rise to changes in many other psychological 
features, the persistence of such a deep value or concern does not necessarily imply a lack of change in these other 
features. With thanks to an anonymous referee.  
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some point in the past, while its use in (2) refers to an agent who is blameworthy at that time. 
Thus, the claims can be clarified as: 
 
 (1’) One can only appropriately forgive an agent who was blameworthy. 
 (2’) An agent who is blameworthy is appropriately blamed, not forgiven. 
 
(1’) still accounts for the idea that forgiveness makes sense only in response to blameworthiness. 
One can still distinguish forgiveness from excuse and justification on its basis. It simply says that 
the only candidates for appropriate forgiveness are those agents that were blameworthy for some 
faulty past conduct. And (2’) still makes sense of the idea that what the blameworthy are worthy 
of is blame, lest we condone the wrong action. But notice now that (3) no longer follows because 
we have acknowledged the possibility that though one was blameworthy, one may be now less or 
not blameworthy for that earlier conduct. One may lack blameworthiness for a past act not only 
because the act was excused or justified, as many assume, but also because the conditions of 
diachronic blameworthiness are less than maximally met. What I wish to emphasize at this point 
is simply that once we properly temporally index blameworthiness, and acknowledge the 
possibility that diachronic blameworthiness can diminish and extinguish, the inference in the 
paradox of forgiveness is revealed to be invalid.  
Before continuing, let me stress what I am not claiming. I do not claim that there is no 
other source of confusion underlying the appeal of the paradox. Some, for instance, argue that 
the paradox is due to an equivocation over different kinds of reasons or senses of 
appropriateness. For example, Hallich (2013) argues that while there can never be moral reasons 
that make forgiveness morally mandatory, there can be prudential reasons as well as non-
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obligating moral reasons in favor of forgiveness. And Wallace (2019), argues that while blame is 
always a fitting response to an agent who has done wrong, there may be non-fitting related 
reasons to critically manage such blame in a way that amounts to forgiveness. I have no dispute 
with the idea that the cessation of blame (in a way that may amount to forgiveness) may be 
supported by other considerations such as its therapeutic value, and that this may give rise to 
some confusion. Both these authors, however, commit themselves to the claim that the paradox 
stands when we hold fixed the relevant sense of appropriateness as fittingness (or, for Hallich, 
moral reasons that make forgiveness morally mandatory). It is this claim that I dispute, 
particularly as it pertains to those who claim, if only implicitly, that the appeal to repentance 
cannot solve the paradox because the repentant remain personally identical with the wrongdoer 
(such as both Hallich and Wallace themselves). 
 Recall that defenders of repentance appeal to the claim that repentance can make 
forgiveness appropriate in virtue of the distancing that occurs between act and agent. Critics of 
repentance, we saw, claimed that the relevant distancing could not occur insofar as one was still 
personally identical with the author of the blameworthy act thereby appealing to the sufficiency 
claim. But that claim is false. The sense of diachronic ownership that is relevant to 
blameworthiness does not concern personal identity, but concerns psychological connectedness 
of the relevant sort. This is the underlying but largely unarticulated insight of the appeal to 
repentance (though see Allais 2008: 38). 
 Recall the earlier quoted passage by Murphy: 
 
[Repentance] is surely the clearest way in which a wrongdoer can sever himself from his 
past wrong. In having a sincere change of heart, he is withdrawing his endorsement from 
his own immoral past behavior; he is saying, “I no longer stand behind the wrongdoing, 
and I want to be separated from it. I stand with you in condemning it.”…I forgive him 




We can now see that the genuinely repentant are those who are, to some extent, relevantly 
psychologically disconnected from their earlier blameworthy action. Genuine repentance, it 
would seem, consists in the breaking of such psychological connections.6 And they are, for that 
reason, less or not blameworthy for the earlier blameworthy action. This is the needed 
explanation of the transformative power of repentance: genuine repentance makes forgiveness 
appropriate because it involves diminished diachronic blameworthiness.  
 Two points of clarification are in order. First, though repentance is one way of breaking 
the relevant connections it is not, clearly, the only way. Repentance, presumably, requires that 
the relevant connections have been broken in a particular way, for example, because the person 
has sufficiently reckoned or wrestled with those problematic aspects of her character. Thus, I 
believe that genuine repentance is sufficient, but not necessary, for a reduction of diachronic 
blameworthiness. Second, I’m inclined to call a reduction of blame in light of an awareness of 
reduced blameworthiness ‘forgiveness.’ Hence, while I do claim, roughly, that repentance 
requires forgiveness, I do not claim that forgiveness requires repentance. My view is compatible 
with the possibility that a reduction of blame in the absence of genuine repentance may amount 
to forgiveness. 
 With this framework in mind, let us look at some examples. Consider Figure 1: 
 
6 Kolnai’s own characterization of repentance is prescient: “…repentance amounts to a loathing and dissolving of 




Figure 1 illustrates a case in which the agent’s diachronic blameworthiness for some particular 
act remains stable between t1 and t2. And, in this case, the blamer’s blame of the agent for that 
act perfectly tracks this fact, in the sense that the blamer blames the agent to the degree that she 
does because the agent is blameworthy to that degree.  In this case it is clear that [the blamer at 
t2] has not forgiven [the agent at t2] for [the act at t1] and that this failure to forgive is perfectly 
appropriate.  





Figure 2 represents a case in which the agent’s blameworthiness diminishes across time. Suppose 
too that, like the case above, the blamer’s blame of the agent perfectly tracks the 
blameworthiness facts. Has the blamer forgiven the agent? I’m inclined to say that yes, [the 
blamer at t2] has fully forgiven [the agent at t2] for [the action at t1], though I recognize that this 
is far from a paradigm case. 




The case represented in Figure 3 is like that of Figure 2 in that we have the same reduction of 
diachronic blameworthiness. But with respect to the actual blamer’s blame of the agent between 
t1 and t2, it is like Figure 1. The blamer stably blames the agent to a high degree between t1 and 
t2, and such blame becomes less and less fitting across that duration. Suppose that at t2 the agent 
makes sincere expressions of repentance to the blamer by way of apology. Suppose that the 
blamer accepts this as genuine and, in light of such an acceptance, no longer blames the agent. 
Has the blamer forgiven the agent at this time? I’m inclined to say that, yes, [the blamer at t2] has 
fully forgiven [the agent at t2] for [the act at t1] and that such forgiveness is appropriate. Further, 
I’m inclined to think that this is a paradigm case of fitting forgiveness.  
 This suggests, among other things, that there is a crucial epistemic element in our 
forgiveness practices. I tentatively suggest that forgiveness, qua distinctively recognizable 
phenomenon, arises in large part due to our epistemically limited nature. Forgiveness is most 
recognizable when there is relatively significant diachronic blame reduction over a relatively 
short duration (e.g. as in Figure 3 in comparison to Figure 2). And insofar as it is plausible, as I 
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think it is, that reductions in diachronic blameworthiness are comparatively more gradual 
(because deep psychological change tends to be comparatively slower), then the most 
recognizable cases of forgiveness will occur in contexts of limited knowledge of the agent’s 
diachronic blameworthiness. The ritual of repentance, apology, and forgiveness looks, from this 
perspective to be an occasion for reevaluating diachronic blameworthiness. Through the process 
of repentance diachronic blameworthiness can diminish, one can express this through apology, 
and a blamer can appropriately acknowledge and react to this through forgiveness.  
 Recall Hallich’s (2013: 1007) claim that in cases involving the severing of personal 
identity, there is a residual paradox of forgiveness. According to this thought, either personal 
identity with the wrongdoer holds or it does not. If it does, then the wrongdoer remains fully 
blameworthy and so does not merit forgiveness. If it does not, then, because the person before us 
is not identical with the wrongdoer, there is no one to forgive. The mistake in this line of 
reasoning is in thinking that the relation that grounds diachronic blameworthiness either holds 
completely or not at all, as it would if that relation were personal identity. But consider the 
possibilities illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 at any time between t1 and t2. In these cases there is a 
partial, but not total, diminishment of diachronic blameworthiness. In such cases a partial 
reduction in blame is fitting and there is a clear target of such diachronic blame reduction. I’m 
inclined to describe this as a case in which partial forgiveness is fitting.7 Such cases, then, 
effectively fly between the horns of Hallich’s dilemma. When it comes to diachronic 
blameworthiness, there is plenty of space between non-mitigation and total exculpation and 
 
7 Note while the claim made in (2’) is true with respect to full forgiveness, it is not true with respect to such partial 
forgiveness. Still, one can accept both the possibility of fitting partial forgiveness and the underlying rationale for 
accepting (2) as it occurs in the initial paradox. This is because one can accept the closely related claim (2’’): An 




forgiveness helps us navigate this moral terrain. Arguably, this is the space of forgiveness as we 
most frequently encounter it. 
 
 
5. Implications and complications 
Before closing I want to briefly consider some further implications and complications of the 
view I have begun to develop. The former are implications with which, if the argument of this 
paper is sound, all full theories of forgiveness must engage. The latter concern questions left 
open by this view.  
 The first implication is that on this view it is not the case that forgiveness is always 
elective, as a number of theorists claim (see, for example, Kolnai 1973-4: 101-102; Sussman 
2005: 87; Hallich 2013; 2016: 1008-1009; in thinking that forgiveness is not always elective, I 
am in agreement with Gamlund 2010 and Milam 2018b). The diachronic blame reduction in 
which forgiveness (at least, partly) consists will be rationally required when the agent’s 
diachronic blameworthiness has diminished or extinguished and the potential forgiver knows 
this. In such a case, the potential forgiver does not have the rationally permissible option to 
continue to blame. To continue to blame would be to misrepresent what the agent is like, and the 
attitude would not be fitting for that reason.  
 This, in turn, implies that accounts that construe forgiveness as the exercise of a 
normative power are, at the least, more limited in scope than is commonly thought. On such 
accounts, forgiveness is thought to involve, roughly, releasing one from a debt or relinquishing 
one’s right to blame. For example, Dana Nelkin writes: 
In forgiving one ceases to hold the offense against the offender, and this in turn means 
releasing them from a special kind of personal obligation incurred as a result of 
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committing the wrong act against one…Forgiveness is distinct from excuse, because a 
release from a personal obligation has no implications for a change in attribution of 
responsibility for the act. (2013: 175) 
As Nelkin conceives it, forgiveness involves ceasing to hold the offense against the offender 
while, presumably, continuing to do so would still be fitting (because, she thinks, there is no 
change in responsibility). Relatedly, on Warmke’s view, “In forgiving we relinquish certain 
rights (for example, to blame)” (2016: 690). Presumably, one has a right to blame a person to a 
degree, in the relevant sense, only if that person is blameworthy to (at least) that degree. Such 
accounts then, are applicable only in cases in which it remains fitting to blame or otherwise hold 
the offense against the person. They are unable to explain, however, cases of the sort I’ve 
emphasized in which blame becomes less fitting over time. If, as I’m inclined to think, we can 
felicitously describe diachronic blame reduction in light of an awareness of diminished 
diachronic blameworthiness as forgiveness, then forgiveness cannot be fully explained by such 
normative power accounts. Because these accounts construe forgiveness as the exercise of a 
power to relinquish fitting attitudes or responses, they only apply to elective forgiveness and not 
all forgiveness is elective. 
 A second implication of this view is that nothing is, in principle, unforgiveable (for 
different arguments to a similar conclusion see Govier 1998; Griswold 2007: 90-97; Murphy 
2009). No matter how synchronically blameworthy an agent is for some earlier action, if there 
are no relevant psychological connections at some later time then the agent at the later time will 
not be diachronically blameworthy for the earlier act. This is akin to multiplication by zero; 
when there are no direct distinctive psychological connections between t1 and t2, it does not 
matter how blameworthy the agent at t1 was because the properties that ground such 
blameworthiness do not themselves persist through time.  
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 A third implication is that forgiveness, in light of diminishing diachronic 
blameworthiness, is not at all in tension with self-respect or respect for morality. Many theorists 
have taken it as a significant challenge to explain why this is so (Kolnai 1973-4; Murphy 1988; 
Hieronymi 2001; Allais 2008). On the view developed here, this challenge is straightforwardly 
met. There is no tension because one may forgive [an agent at t2] while not forgiving [the agent 
at t1]. One may blame [the agent at those times at which the agent has the properties that ground 
blameworthiness], and one may not blame [the agent at those times at which she fails to have the 
properties that ground blameworthiness]. Forgiveness, when grounded in an acknowledgement 
of reduced diachronic blameworthiness, is fully compatible with respect for oneself and for 
morality because such forgiveness does not require abandoning blame of those who are worthy 
of it.  
 Fourth, and for similar reasons, blame and forgiveness of the dead can be appropriate. 
This is because acknowledging that there is a temporal component to blameworthiness (the 
subject of blameworthiness as I have here formulated it), allows that there may be an asymmetry 
between the time at which one does or does not blame and, as it were, the time to which one does 
or does not blame. For instance, at t3 B at may come to truly believe that a long since dead person 
A did go through a deep and genuine process of repentance later in his life such that at t2, just 
prior to his death, his diachronic blameworthiness for an earlier act at t1 was eliminated. In this 
way, [B at t3] may cease to blame [A at t2] for [the act at t1], and this may amount to forgiveness 
of [A at t2], who is dead at t3, for [the act at t1].  
 So much for implications. The first complication, gestured to above, is that this account 
does not attempt to explain elective forgiveness. While I have claimed that not all forgiveness is 
elective, my account is compatible with the claim that some forgiveness is. Elective forgiveness 
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is forgiveness in which continued and undiminished blame is fitting; that is, forgiveness of an 
agent at t who is blameworthy. Because I have been primarily interested in addressing the issue 
of whether forgiveness can be fitting, I have not engaged with the issue of whether the cessation 
of fitting blame can be appropriate in other senses and whether any of these amount to elective 
forgiveness (on these other senses see Hallich 2013; Wallace 2019). Some may see this issue as 
the primary question a theory of forgiveness should answer (for example, Calhoun 1992; Allais 
2008: 39; Zaibert 2008: 368; though see Fricker 2019 for an argument that elective forgiveness is 
parasitic on earned forgiveness). Perhaps that is true. I am content to emphasize that in the 
context of theorizing about forgiveness it is crucial to recognize that blameworthiness can 
diminish over time, and that when it does continued blame, of the sort characteristic of a failure 
to forgive, is unfitting.  
 Lastly, while I’ve been here concerned with the implications of the possibility of 
diminishing blameworthiness for forgiveness, I want to briefly raise the possibility that 
blameworthiness may sometimes increase over time. Suppose that at t1 an agent commits a 
blameworthy action due to a particular set of morally criticizable values and concerns. Suppose 
that at t2, not only have these values and concerns persisted, they have actually increased in 
strength and the agent reflectively endorses them to greater extent than he did at t1. In such a 
case, then, it may be plausible to think that the agent’s blameworthiness has increased over time 
(see Khoury 2013: 742). And, if so, it is possible that we readjust our blame accordingly, 




8 And just as one may make an expression of remorse by way of apology, one may make an expression of enhanced 




The paradox of forgiveness claims that appropriate forgiveness is logically impossible; 
forgiveness is never a fitting response. I’ve argued that the paradox is generated by an 
equivocation between different temporal dimensions of blameworthiness. This equivocation, in 
turn, is due to the common, if implicit, belief that personal identity is the diachronic ownership 
condition on blameworthiness. But psychological connectedness of the relevant sort, not 
personal identity, grounds diachronic blameworthiness. This, in turn, provides the needed 
explanation of the transformative power of repentance; genuine repentance makes forgiveness 
appropriate because it consists in breaking the relevant psychological connections that ground 
diachronic blameworthiness. This view has a number of significant implications with which any 
full theory of forgiveness must engage, largely due to the fact that while personal identity is 
binary and transitive, psychological connectedness is a scalar and intransitive relation.  
 Let me end by emphasizing the relative modesty of this view. It simply follows the 
implications of the claim that the property of being blameworthy for an action can diminish and 
extinguish across time. This claim is no more metaphysically puzzling than the claim that the 
property of being an insightful philosopher or a fast swimmer can also diminish and extinguish 
over time. When blameworthiness has reduced over time, then a reduction of blame is fitting. 
When blameworthiness has extinguished over time, then the cessation of blame is fitting and 
continued blame is unfitting. I am inclined to call the reduction or cessation of blame, in light of 
an awareness of reduced or extinguished diachronic blameworthiness, ‘forgiveness’ though 
perhaps you wish to call it something else.  
 
Acknowledgements: For helpful comments I thank Cheshire Calhoun, Benjamin Matheson, Per-Erik Milam, Oded 




Allais, Lucy. (2008) ‘Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness’. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 36, 33-68. 
Butler, Joseph. (1726) 2017 ‘Fifteen Sermons Preached at Rolls Chapel’. In David McNaughton 
(ed.), Joseph Butler: Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 1-134. 
Calhoun, Cheshire. (1992) ‘Changing One’s Heart’. Ethics, 103, 76-96. 
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson. (2000) ‘The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ 
of Emotions’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61, 65-90. 
Dennett, Daniel. (1978) ‘Brain Writing and Mind Reading’. In Brainstorms: Philosophical 
Essays on Mind and Psychology (London: Penguin Books), 43-56.  
Fricker, Miranda. (2019) ‘Forgiveness—An Ordered Pluralism’. Australasian Philosophical 
Review, 3, 241-260. 
Gamlund, Espen. (2010) ‘The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers’. International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 18, 651-671. 
Govier, Trudy. (1999) ‘Forgiveness and the Unforgivable’. American Philosophical Quarterly,  
36, 59-75. 
 
Graham, Peter A. (2014) ‘A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness’. Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research, 88, 388-409.  
 
Griswold, Charles L. (2007) Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Hallich, Oliver. (2013) ‘Can the Paradox of Forgiveness be Dissolved?’. Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, 16, 999-1017. 
Hallich, Oliver. (2016) ‘A Plea Against Apologies’. Philosophia, 44, 1007-20. 
Hieronymi, Pamela. (2001) ‘Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness’. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 62, 529-555. 
Howard, Christopher. (2018) ‘Fittingness’. Philosophy Compass, 13, 1-14.  
Kekes, John. (2009) ‘Blame Versus Forgiveness’. The Monist, 92, 488–506. 
Khoury, Andrew C. (2013) ‘Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility’. Philosophical Studies, 
165, 735-752. 
Khoury, Andrew C. (2018) ‘The Objects of Moral Responsibility’. Philosophical Studies, 175, 
1357-1381. 
Khoury, Andrew C. and Benjamin Matheson. (2018) ‘Is Blameworthiness Forever?’. Journal of 
the American Philosophical Association, 4, 204-224. 
Kolnai, Aurel. (1973-4) ‘Forgiveness’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 74, 91-106. 
32 
 
Lewis, David. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Levy, Neil. (2007) Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Locke, John. (1694) 1975 ‘Of Identity and Diversity’. In John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 33-52. 
Matheson, Benjamin. (2014) ‘Compatibilism and Personal Identity’. Philosophical Studies, 170,  
317-334. 
 
Milam, Per-Erik. (2018a) ‘Reasons to Forgive’. Analysis, 79, 242-251. 
Milam, Per-Erik. (2018b) ‘Against Elective Forgiveness’. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 
21, 569-584. 
Mott, Christian. (2018) ‘Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity’. In Tania Lombrozo, 
Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Vol. 
2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 243-269.  
Murphy, Jeffrie and Jean Hampton. (1988) Forgiveness and Mercy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Murphy, Jeffrie. (2009) ‘The Case of Dostoevsky's General: Some Ruminations on Forgiving the 
Unforgivable’. The Monist, 92, 556-582. 
Na’aman, Oded. (2021) ‘The Rationality of Emotional Change: Towards a Process View’. Noûs 
55, 245-269.  
Nelkin, Dana. (2013) ‘Freedom and Forgiveness’. In Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette (eds.), 
Free Will and Moral Responsibility (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing), 165-188.  
Olson, Eric. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Parfit, Derek. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pettigrove, Glen. (2021) ‘Fitting Attitudes and Forgiveness’. In Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, 
and Brandon Warmke (eds.), Forgiveness and Its Moral Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 57-82. 
Portmore, Douglas W. (2019) Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
Portmore, Douglas W. (forthcoming) ‘A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-
Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary’. In Andreas Brekke Carlsson (ed.), Self-
Blame and Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Richards, Norvin. (1988) ‘Forgiveness’. Ethics, 99, 77-97. 
33 
 
Rosen, Gideon. (2015) ‘The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility’. In Randolph Clarke, 
Michael McKenna, and Angela Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 65-87. 
Shoemaker, David. (2012) ‘Responsibility Without Identity’. Harvard Review of Philosophy, 18, 
109-32. 
Sider, Theodore. (2001) Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press.  
 
Sripada, Chandra. (2016) ‘Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility’.  
Philosophical Studies, 173, 1203-1232. 
 
Strawson, P. F. (1962) ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48,  
 187–211. 
 
Sussman, David. (2005) ‘Kantian Forgiveness’. Kant-Studien, 96, 85-107. 
 
Tierney, Hannah, Chris Howard, Victor Kumar, Trevor Kvaran, and Shaun Nichols. (2014)  
‘How Many of Us Are There?’. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental 
Philosophy of Mind (New York: Bloomsbury Academic), 181-202.  
 
Wallace, R. Jay. (2019) ‘Trust, Anger, Resentment, Forgiveness: On Blame and its  
Reasons’. European Journal of Philosophy, 27, 537-551. 
Warmke, Brandon. (2016) ‘The Normative Significance of Forgiveness’. Australasian Journal  
of Philosophy, 94, 687-703. 
Warmke, Brandon and Michael McKenna. (2013) ‘Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and  
 Conversation.’ In Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette (eds.), Free Will and Moral  
Responsibility (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 189-212. 
 
Zaibert, Leo. (2009) ‘The Paradox of Forgiveness’. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, 365-393. 
 
